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Abstract 
Recent research reports the need for consistent incentives in blockchain-based systems. 
In this study, we investigate how incentives for a blockchain-based inter-organizational 
network should be designed to ensure a high quality of data, exchanged and stored within 
the network. For this, we use two complementary methodological approaches: an Action 
Design Research approach in combination with agent-based modelling, and 
demonstrate, through the example of a real-world blockchain project, how such an 
incentive system may be modelled. The proposed incentive system features a rating 
mechanism influenced by measures of data correction. We evaluate the incentive system 
in a simulation to show how effective the system is in terms of sustaining a high quality 
of data. Thus, the paper contributes to our understanding of incentives in inter-
organizational settings and, more broadly, to our understanding of incentive 
mechanisms in blockchain economy. 
Keywords:  Blockchain, inter-organizational networks, incentives, data quality, Action Design 
Research 
 
Introduction  
Many industries struggle to solve problems and improve processes which involve interrelationships (in 
some cases not apparent) between different untrusted, heterogeneous organizations. In many sectors (e.g. 
education, healthcare, automotive industry), there is no way an individual organization (including a 
governmental body) is able to resolve emerging problems of high complexity acting on its own (Hoberecht 
et al. 2011). Nowadays, organizations establish relationships with others in nearly every step of the 
execution of their business transactions (Powell et al. 1996). An inter-organizational network can be 
described as a structure which includes actors (organizations) and relationships between them (Popp et al. 
2013). Trust is the basis of inter-organizational relationships which makes them possible, and enhances the 
effectiveness of the network (Popp et al. 2013). Thus, organizations build up inter-organizational networks 
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in order to address emerging problems and profit from the resulting improved performance (e.g. efficiency 
gains, new business models) and cooperation (e.g. innovations, knowledge sharing).  
To resolve trust issues, such mechanisms as legal contracts, regulations, and incentive alignment are 
traditionally established. Recently, with the emergence of blockchain technology, organizations started 
experimenting and building up specific consortia, and this became a popular means of working 
cooperatively to attain certain business goals (Gratzke et al. 2018). More than 40 such consortia were 
established by the year 2017 (ibid.). Though the potential of blockchain technology for inter-organizational 
relationships has not been fully explored yet, it is claimed to be an enabler of business relationships in many 
fields (the financial sector and logistics currently being the most prominent of these). Organizations 
involved in blockchain consortia opt for secure and transparent data exchange and storage, which is 
promised by blockchain technology. However, to be able to generate value from this exchange and storage 
(which is the ultimate goal of such inter-organizational relationships), these consortia should achieve a high 
quality of stored data.  
One of the important dimensions of blockchain governance (which comes from the literature on IT 
governance) is incentives (Beck et al. 2018). Incentives motivate agents (network participants) to act in 
such a way that they freely choose their behavior so that it is consciously or subconsciously aligned with the 
system goals (Beck et al. 2018). These incentives may have monetary (e.g. earnings) or non-monetary 
character (e.g. reputation, opportunities for new business models, beneficial cooperation). While incentives 
are widely explored in research streams on IT governance, for blockchain technology there is a breadth of 
questions that remain open. Recently, Beck et al. (2018) called for exploration of incentive mechanisms1 in 
blockchain-based systems and proposed the related research agenda. In our study, inspired by Beck et al. 
(2018), we focus on an incentive mechanism placed in a blockchain-based inter-organizational network, 
which ensures a high quality of exchanged and store data within the network. By ‘data quality’ we mean the 
correctness of the stored data (if the data is accurate, valid and error-free) as well as its completeness (none 
of relevant data is missing). The problem of poor input data (also often called “Garbage In, Garbage Out”) 
is widely known. In the context of blockchains it becomes even more relevant to ensure high data quality 
because, once recorded, the data cannot be changed any further due to the immutability of blockchains. 
Therefore, to ensure that an inter-organizational network can extract value from data exchanged and stored 
in a blockchain-based system, the data quality must be assured in the first place. Consequently, in this paper 
we address the following research question: 
RQ: How can we incentivize data quality in blockchains for inter-organizational networks? 
We assume that achieving high data quality is a necessary factor to reach the goal of the inter-organizational 
network and to foster prosperity within the network. Under this assumption, we specify the question to be 
addressed as follows: 
Sub-RQ: How can an incentive mechanism make a blockchain-based inter-organizational network 
consistent2 and self-sustaining3? 
In this paper we use two complementary methodological approaches: an Action Design Research (ADR) 
(Sein et al. 2011) approach in combination with agent-based modelling (Epstein 2006; Macal and North 
2007). The contributions of this study are two-fold. Firstly, we create a parsimonious model (describing 
agents, their behavior, interactions, and the environment in which they operate), which is aimed at 
resolving incentivization problems related to the quality of exchanged and provided data on the basis of 
learnings from an existing blockchain project (further described as Car Dossier). In order to evaluate this 
model, we run extensive simulations to show what effects it has on the blockchain-based inter-
organizational network. Secondly, we discuss what implications the results of our study have in terms of 
design of incentives in blockchain networks, therewith bringing value to practitioners. In doing so, we make 
                                                             
1 Here and further in the paper we use terms ‘incentive model’, ‘incentive system’, ‘incentive mechanism’ inter-changeably though we 
acknowledge their conceptual differences. 
2 An incentive system is said to be consistent, if a rational actor’s best strategy is to act according to the goals of the incentive 
mechanism. 
3 An incentive system is called self-sustaining with respect to a given framework, if it fosters the prosperity of this framework and is 
attack-resilient. 
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a step towards better understanding of mechanisms of incentive systems in blockchain-based inter-
organizational networks, blockchain governance, and blockchain economy in general. 
The paper is structured as follows: In the second section, Car Dossier, we describe the project this work is 
built upon by using methods from the Action Design Research approach (Sein et al. 2011). The project 
description gives an overview of the built-up consortium and the inter-organizational network of the Car 
Dossier project. In the third section, Related Work, we review the relevant literature on inter-organizational 
networks and general blockchain-based incentive systems. Fourth, the section Methodology describes the 
approach taken in this study. Fifth, we describe the Results of the study, in particular those emerging from 
the proposed model for a blockchain-based incentive system in an inter-organizational network. Then, in 
the Discussion we reflect on the results, their meaning and the implications for research. Finally, we draw 
Conclusions from our study, outline its limitations and propose future research directions. 
Car Dossier 
A consumer study, conducted in 2017 in Germany, reports that the automotive market is in the top 3 
markets with the least trust from consumers (followed by banks/insurances and the telecommunications 
industry) (Lades 2017). In particular, in the second-hand car market consumers suffer from such problems 
as: the car being in worse condition than initially indicated, accident damage which was not previously 
disclosed, limited documentation provided, fraud, etc. (European Union 2014). In a consortium of 
companies from the automotive market, the Car Dossier project addresses and aims to resolve problems of 
mistrust, intransparency and process inefficiency by creating a blockchain-based solution. The involved 
parties are companies (an insurance company, an importer and official car dealer, a car-sharing company) 
and public authorities (the Road Traffic Agency). The goal is to collect various data over a car’s lifetime in 
order to create a valuable “Car Dossier” and a shared platform to exchange data and increase efficiency of 
operations. As there are multiple parties involved who do not fully trust or know one other, the participants 
opt for a blockchain-based solution. The blockchain technology serves as an enabler for such inter-
organizational relationships. From the technology point of view, centralized technologies may solve those 
issues, but they are legally and organizationally not acceptable. Legal issues (not the least because of data 
protection issues and the limited task of a public administration) prevent governments from running such 
systems. Furthermore, the participants do not trust any single provider to run a platform for them. So, the 
‘distributedness’ of blockchain governance is a major driver for consortia to rely on blockchain technologies.  
The Car Dossier solution is built on top of Hyperledger Fabric, a modular open-source platform providing 
a permissioned blockchain infrastructure (“Hyperledger Fabric” 2018), and is driven by a consortium of the 
above-mentioned companies with the further goal of being open for all players in the Swiss automotive 
market. The permissioned framework is ideal for a business application in which the participants require 
some means for identification but do not necessarily fully trust one another (Vukolić 2017). Such a system 
creates an inter-organizational network of companies which calls for well-established governance 
mechanisms (we explain the notion of inter-organizational networks later in Related Work). One of the 
governance mechanisms is an incentive system, which should ensure the consistency and the self-
sustaining operation of the system in terms of quality of provided data, gains and losses participants 
experience through participation in the network, and their behavior (e.g. how active the participants are, 
how to identify and avoid malicious behavior). 
The blockchain stores data associated with vehicles: accidents, servicing, technical issues and transfer of 
property. The complete set of records for a specific vehicle is the Car Dossier. The data is saved, encrypted 
on the blockchain, and customers (e.g. private or organizational) can buy access to a relevant Car Dossier 
they may be interested in. A system based on smart contracts, ensuring payment for data suppliers or 
payment of a fee for data consumers upon fulfillment of certain conditions, provides a financial incentive 
for participation in the network. Overall, this is a system in which multiple parties are enabled to do 
business together without necessarily trusting one another. For such a decentralized and automated 
solution to be effective, an appropriate incentive model must be in place such that all participating parties 
contribute the necessary amount of high-quality data to the system. Such an incentive model can again be 
implemented and operated autonomously in the setup described above. Ultimately, a self-functioning 
system should emerge within which all agents are motivated to contribute car data without the need of a 
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centralized authority to organize the information flow. This should also show that the incentives are 
consistent, meaning that the effect of the incentives are as desired4.  
Related Work 
Inter-organizational Networks 
Even though inter-organizational networks are a well-established phenomenon, there is no agreement on a 
single definition to be used equally in organizational studies, IS research or social sciences. However, a 
common understanding of inter-organizational networks posit that they all incorporate “social interaction 
(of individuals acting on behalf of their organizations), relationships, connectedness, collaboration, 
collective action, trust, and cooperation” (Provan et al. 2007). In our study, we adhere to the definition that 
suggests  inter-organizational networks consist of actors (individuals or organizations), relationships 
between them (connections) and the meaning of their relationships (Popp et al. 2013). We acknowledge 
that the term “inter-organizational networks” is often used in relation to supply chains. In our study, 
organizations interact through the platform, where they exchange data and are financially rewarded for it. 
Therefore, they are naturally intertwined and networked with one another. 
Previous studies acknowledge that trust is the basis for inter-organizational relationships, which makes 
cooperation between actors possible. The higher trust is, the more successful the cooperation results (Popp 
et al. 2013). With the rise of blockchain technology5, which can be built in trust-free environments (Beck et 
al. 2016), such inter-organizational ties should be reconsidered in terms of governance of inter-
organizational networks. Blockchain systems can play the role of facilitator in inter-organizational networks 
by minimizing (or possibly eliminating) the need for control over others in risky situations (Das and Teng 
2001), thus giving rise to more trusted relationships. Though blockchain technology brings certain value 
for service systems due to its design and underlying concepts (like immutability, transparency, integrity of 
data, etc.) (Seebacher and Schüritz 2017), the technology itself is not a holy grail which is able to resolve 
any emergent issue. Therefore, it is mandatory to study how such a system should be designed to bring the 
promised value. In particular, in our study we focus on the incentive mechanism which, if correctly set up, 
should ensure a high quality of data in a blockchain-based inter-organizational network. 
Incentive Systems for Blockchains 
Reasonable and well-aligned incentives play an important role not only in the digital economy, but also in 
the blockchain economy (Beck et al. 2018). Without a consistent and self-sustaining incentive mechanism, 
a blockchain economy would not be possible. Though Beck et al. (2018) do not provide a definition of an 
incentive system for blockchain economy, they identify three levels on which incentives should be aligned: 
digital processes in peer-to-peer exchanges for value creation of blockchain-based digital goods; incentives 
to create private goods, club goods, and public goods; and new network-based processes that incentivize 
the peer-to-peer nodes to reach consensus. Beck et al. (2018) propose numerous research questions to be 
explored on all three levels to develop deeper understanding of incentive systems. In our study, we look at 
how an incentive system may be designed to overcome the challenge of insufficient data quality in a 
blockchain-based inter-organizational network so that creation of a public good, a valuable car dossier, may 
be possible. 
There are a limited number of studies that address incentives in blockchain systems. Xu et al. (2016) found 
that for systems where a permissioned blockchain is a more feasible solution than a permissionless one, 
and some data may be stored off-chain (for example, for achieving privacy), “an additional economic 
incentive is required for the participants to be honest.” This incentive may include security deposits, 
reputation or rating mechanisms. Okada et al. (2017) distinguish blockchain systems on the basis of the 
                                                             
4 There is a famous term for the case when incentives make the situation even worse: "The cobra effect". It is based on an anecdote set 
at the time of the British rule of colonial India. The Britons were concerned about the high number of dangerous cobras in Delhi. They 
decided to offer a bounty for every dead cobra to the people of India. As a result, the Indians started to breed cobras at home which 
eventually led to a larger population of cobras.  
5  We believe that the reader is familiar with foundations of blockchain technology. Therefore, we do not provide any further 
explanation on its basics. 
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nature of incentives in place: market- and non-market-based. Market-based incentives are tightly bound to 
a token or cryptocurrency, its pricing mechanisms and its market price. In contrast to those, consortium 
blockchain systems need non-market-based incentives. In this case, there is no need for participants to 
engage in an energy-consuming and competitive processes (such as mining), they can instead agree on an 
appropriate mechanism (Okada et al. 2017). However, in these situations there should be additional 
incentive mechanisms (like legal measures, e.g. contracts or regulations), which will ensure appropriate 
behavior of participants in the network. Okada et al. (2017) conclude that there should be further 
exploration of how such incentive systems should be designed, evolve and change over time.  
Finally, we look at the literature on cases similar to the one we have in the Car Dossier project. Notheisen 
et al. (2017) address the problems of information asymmetries in the car market by implementing proof-
of-concept prototype to gather history of a real-world asset (a car) in a public blockchain-based system. In 
their study, Notheisen et al. (2017) show the feasibility of the case for utilizing blockchain technology. 
However, the questions regarding incentives in this system remain undiscussed and still open: How is high-
quality data achieved? How can the system be protected from the misbehavior of its participants, i.e., 
prevented from inserting incorrect data? Some visionary solutions include the integration of sensors in 
processes related to collection of data or related to physical objects; or the usage of oracles - so-called 
gatekeepers - to approve the data to be entered into the network. In our study, we take a step further and 
address these questions. 
Methodology 
Action Design Research and Project Setting 
In order to define requirements for the design of incentives in blockchain-based inter-organizational 
networks that ensure data quality, and further to propose a model for an incentive system, we follow the 
ADR approach (Sein et al. 2011). ADR allows for the design of an IT artifact embedded in an organizational 
context. It encompasses proven methods from both Design Science Research and Action Research. The 
problem and the proposed solution addressed in this study call for close collaboration with a consortium of 
companies that build up a blockchain-based inter-organizational network. This requires continuous 
examination of the specific organizational setting by intervening and evaluating (Sein et al. 2011). The ADR 
methodology is the right means not only by which to design and build an innovative IT artifact (Hevner 
2004), but also to embed it into and learn from the organizational context while addressing a problematic 
situation (Sein et al. 2011). The ADR project is conducted within the Car Dossier project described above. 
Table 1 summarizes how ADR was set up for this study in terms of its stages and principles.  
Stage 1: Problem formulation in the ADR project. In order to gain an overview of the state of the art in the 
field, extensive literature research was conducted as a starting point (Vom Brocke et al. 2009). The focus 
was put on existing incentive models in current blockchain implementations as well as in other peer-to-
peer networks. Four semi-structured interviews (Myers and Newman 2007) with each of the business 
project partners in the Car Dossier, conducted between April and July 2017, were analyzed in order to 
understand the business activities of organizations. Furthermore, the group of researchers involved in the 
project attended tri-weekly project meetings that took place between August and November 2017. These 
meetings and discussions served as targeted observation sessions to determine specific problems in terms 
of data quality and incentives. 
Stage 2: Building, Intervention, and Evaluation: we formulated the early requirements for the incentive 
system, and these were verified on 5th October 2017 in a focus group with the project partners. A scenario-
based design (Rosson and Carroll 2009) approach helped us in building up a link from abstract examples, 
where incentive mechanisms are needed; to more specific examples (two scenarios were identified: car birth 
and logging in the blockchain; car usage and case of an accident). After that, inspired by the modelling 
approach for complex adaptive systems (Nan 2011) (see a more detailed description in the Modelling 
Approach section), we designed the first version of the model for the incentive system. 
Stage 3: Reflection and Learning: the model was evaluated in the follow-up focus group on 16th November 
2017. The focus group provided constraints for the model. Furthermore, several rounds of workshops 
within the ADR team, conducted between February and April 2018, helped in refining the model (e.g. 
including specific roles in the model). 
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Table 1. ADR process 
Stages and Principles Method Artifact 
Stage 1: Problem formulation 
Principle 1: 
Practice-
Inspired 
Research 
Research is driven by the need for a 
consistent incentive system for a 
blockchain-based inter-organizational 
network in the Car Dossier project. 
Semi-structured 
interviews (Myers 
and Newman 2007) 
Participation in the 
project meetings 
Recognition: 
Problem 
exploration in 
terms of data 
quality for the Car 
Dossier network. 
Principle 2: 
Theory-
Ingrained 
Artifact 
The academic literature on inter-
organizational networks and on 
incentive systems for blockchain 
applications is used as the theoretical 
basis. 
Literature review 
(Vom Brocke et al. 
2009) 
Stage 2: Building, Intervention, and Evaluation 
Principle 3: 
Reciprocal 
Shaping 
Early requirements are formulated in 
collaboration with practitioners.  
Focus groups 
(Liamputtong 2009) 
Scenario-based 
design (Rosson and 
Carroll 2009) 
Car Dossier 
specific model:  
 
1st Version: 
The first proposal 
for the model, 
incorporating 
actors of the 
network and the 
early requirements 
in the model. 
 
 
 
 
2nd Version: 
The model 
incorporates Car 
Dossier specific 
roles and 
constraints, and 
includes additional 
mechanisms to 
address occurring 
problems. 
Principle 4: 
Mutually 
Influential 
Roles 
The ADR team includes researchers 
and practitioners in order to include 
theoretical, technical, and practical 
perspectives. 
 
Principle 5: 
Authentic and 
Concurrent 
Evaluation 
The incentive system is first designed 
and then evaluated within the ADR 
team. 
Complex adaptive 
systems (Nan 2011) 
Focus groups 
(Liamputtong 2009) 
Stage 3: Reflection and Learning 
Principle 6: 
Guided 
Emergence 
A better understanding of the 
organizational context is gained in the 
2nd iteration for model refinement. The 
incentive system is examined in the 
simulation, ensuring that the model 
fulfills the set goals (consistent and self-
sustaining incentive system for the Car 
Dossier network), corresponds to the 
emergent requirements (network-
specific characteristics), and is formally 
valid. 
Complex adaptive 
systems (Nan 2011) 
Agent-based 
simulation (Epstein 
2006) 
Stage 4: Formalization of Learning 
Principle 7: 
Generalized 
Outcomes 
A generalized model is created to show 
how an incentive mechanism can make 
a blockchain-based inter-organi-
zational network consistent and self-
sustaining, positioning the Car Dossier 
platform as an instance. 
Complex adaptive 
systems (Nan 2011) 
Agent-based 
simulation (Epstein 
2006) 
Generalized 
Model:  
The final version 
that can be applied 
to blockchain-
based inter-
organizational 
networks. 
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Stage 4: Formalization of Learning: we generalized our Car Dossier specific model to a general one to show 
how such an incentive model might be designed in heterogeneous inter-organizational networks. In the 
paper, the concepts from the model are presented together with the instance solution for the Car Dossier 
project.  
Modelling Approach  
One way to describe an inter-organizational network of high complexity and changing dynamics, is to treat 
it as a complex adaptive system (CAS) (Choi et al. 2001). CAS describes “interplay between a system and its 
environment and the co-evolution of both the system and the environment” (Choi et al. 2001). CAS can be 
referred to as “a system that emerges over time into a coherent form, and adapts and organizes itself without 
any singular entity deliberately managing or controlling it” (Choi et al. 2001). One important characteristic 
of CAS is that there is no central governance mechanism put in place. This type of systems is not controlled 
by a single rule, but by different distributed interacting parts that have little or no central control over them. 
Each of these parts has its own governance rules, but altogether they influence the system by various means. 
This enables CAS to be highly adaptive to its surroundings (Holland 1992). This property closely resembles 
the spirit of decentralized blockchain-based systems, and thus we argue it is a natural fit for the design and 
analysis of an incentive system for a blockchain-based inter-organizational network. Furthermore, 
originating from studies on biological systems and later applied to numerous socio-economic systems, “CAS 
have the ability to self-organize and dynamically reorganize their components in ways better suited to 
survive and excel in their environments, and this adaptive ability occurs, remarkably, over an enormous 
range of scales” (Macal and North 2007). These factors, self-organization and adaptation, correspond to 
the requirements for designing the incentive system we propose in this study. 
Though there is no single definition that researchers agree on, as the concept is still developing and 
changing depending on the research field (Nan 2011), three components of CAS are established and 
commonly recognized. These concepts are agents, environment and interactions (Nan 2011). We use the 
three basic concepts of CAS as a tool to describe the building blocks of the incentive system we design. First, 
agents are actors or single entities in the system. They may have certain attributes, which reflect the internal 
state of agents, and behave according to specific rules. Second, environment is a medium for agents to 
operate and interact. Environment may be characterized by its structure. Third, interactions are behaviors 
of agents that may be characterized by connections between agents and flows of resources between them. 
During the modelling process, activities within the ADR project gave input for the definition of certain 
attributes of agents (like their roles and behaviors). Beyond this, the activities helped define the agents’ 
interactions in the systems aligned to the idea of creating a data market within the Car Dossier project. 
In order to analyze interactions of the agents in the environment of a CAS upon a certain set of rules, 
researchers use agent-based modelling (Epstein 2006; Macal and North 2007) as a powerful tool for 
computational simulation. We keep the modelling approach parsimonious, intending to reduce the set of 
parameters to a bare minimum, which allows us to disentangle their role in the overall system properties. 
Then, following the approach of Nan (2011), we conduct extensive simulations to measure global properties 
and the influence of certain parameters in the system. More specifically, we measure how certain quality 
factors of the dossiers may be achieved within the network. Thus the simulation tests the effectiveness of 
the incentive system. Later, under Simulation, we describe what and how parameters for the simulation 
were set. 
Results 
Problem Formulation 
In this section, we explain the problem addressed and define the high-level requirements for the incentive 
system. Our research is driven by the need for a consistent and self-sustaining incentive model for a 
blockchain system that mediates inter-organizational relationships in the form of data exchange on cars’ 
history transactions. As the ADR team was actively involved in the creation of the system, the process of 
problem analysis was highly iterative and included feedback from the project partners (from the Car Dossier 
project) in interviews and project meetings (as described in Methodology). The quality of provided data is 
difficult to control. Though blockchain technology, thanks to its characteristic of immutability, ensures that 
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entered data cannot be altered, it is still not clear how to ensure the initial input of data is correct (in cases 
of unintentional error or intentional misbehavior) and its supply is constant.  
Data quality may be hindered by technical challenges (e.g. incorrect manual input of data, no visual 
interface or not enough competence to use the system), strategic considerations (e.g. an organization does 
not wish to reveal any critical business information, and thus changes the data), data protection and privacy 
(e.g. how to deal with the private data of car owners in such a distributed system, and clarity over who owns 
the data records), regulations (e.g. in cases when state organizations such as the Road Traffic Agency need 
to be enabled by law to use such systems as the basis for car registration checkups). Moreover, organizations 
may act maliciously, providing incorrect data on purpose. Thus the first requirement we set for our incentive 
system is to ensure data correctness, meaning that the records entering the blockchain are correct. 
Another issue in the Car Dossier refers to missing records in the history of a car. This may happen due to 
the factors described above, or simply because organizations which could provide the needed data are not 
a part of the network and thus do not contribute. Furthermore, the quantity of provided data should be 
taken into consideration as organizations, depending on their roles, may have different amounts of available 
data to provide. Thus one should distinguish data which may be provided constantly in large portions (e.g. 
telemetry data) and data which can be provided only once (e.g. car production data). However, when 
considering the quantity of provided data, it is important to take into account that the key is not to achieve 
large amounts of data, but high-quality data that guarantees the informativeness of a dossier. All in all, this 
provides us with the second requirement for the system – to ensure data completeness, meaning that none 
of the possible data records in a dossier are missing.  
These two factors (incorrect and missing data) decrease the overall quality of dossiers and threatens the 
prosperity of a system in which the goal is to ensure a high quality of exchanged and stored data.  
The Car Dossier Incentive Model 
We propose the incentive model in order to ensure the high quality of dossiers (in terms of data correctness 
and completeness) in the system. We describe concepts in the model, i.e., its building blocks, and show how 
they are associated with one another within the incentive model. We describe the model (following the basic 
concepts of CAS) from two perspectives: a general perspective and a case-specific one. From the general 
perspective, we introduce the concept and give a conceptual definition for it. From the case-specific 
perspective, we provide the definition in relation to the Car Dossier project. Table 2 gives a concise overview 
of the main concepts constructed and used in the model. The model is not intended to give a full description 
of reality, which would be an unattainable task; instead, it focuses on aspects which are crucial and relevant 
for the emerging problems discussed above.  
Agents 
In the Car Dossier project, agents are different organizations within the automotive sector in Switzerland 
that are involved in the network. These organizations provide data about the history of cars throughout 
their lifecycle: from the moment a car gets produced to its utilization. An example of an organization may 
be a specific insurance company or a repair shop. Agents are grouped according to their roles (e.g., the role 
of insurer includes all insurance companies in the network). Roles are attributed on the basis of business 
activities, responsibilities and rights in the network. Some roles provide more data than others; however, 
this lies in the very nature of the respective industries. Therefore, the revenues of a dossier should be 
distributed equally if all involved partners put the same relative effort into providing data. We also 
differentiate between sizes (Pareto distributed (Lucas Jr 1978), as known in the literature as an empirical 
fact) of agents to ensure full market inclusion: smaller players in the market should not be discriminated 
against while providing and consuming data in the system (e.g., small repair shop vs. large insurance 
company). Organizations may act maliciously or behave well. By malicious behavior, we mean provision of 
incorrect data (e.g., a repair shop which falsifies data on repair works) or the act of hiding data. There is a 
proportion of malicious agents in the system (∆"#$%&%'()), who act with a probability 𝑝"	maliciously. Roles, 
sizes and behaviors constitute the three necessary attributes we use to define agents in our model. We take 
a frequentist approach to describe behaviors (maliciousness of agents, how often they add wrong data, etc.), 
because this is a variable that can be obtained from observations, irrespective of any assumption of the 
decision-making process by the agents. Therefore, this is the most minimalistic approach that can be taken. 
The goal of the proposed incentive system is to validate and demonstrate whether or not it is able to resist 
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malicious behaviors of agents and thus keep the high quality of data. We want to show that by means of this 
incentive system we increase the rate of the correct data, even in presence of many malicious agents. We 
also identify what agents to target to increase the completeness of dossiers. 
As suggested by the literature (Okada et al. 2017), we introduce a rating mechanism. The rating mechanism 
influences the revenues an organization gains from its participation in the system. The rating of an 
organization should prevent it from providing incorrect data (incorrect data results in a lower rating, which 
subsequently results in lower revenues) and incentivize quality control (reporting of incorrect data leads to 
a higher rating and thus to higher revenues). As a result, each organization gets its rating in the system. 
The global rating measures the organization’s behavior as a data provider (we call it a dossier rating) and a 
reporter of incorrect data (we call it a system rating). For simplicity reasons, we do not weight the impact 
of the ratings differently in relation to the global rating. However, this should be considered in more detail 
when developing the model further. 
Table 2. Description of the Concepts  
Concept Conceptual definition Case-specific description 
1. Agents 
Organization Organizations are participants in the 
blockchain network that interact with the 
network in a certain way. 
In the Car Dossier project there are 
several organizations from the 
automotive sector in Switzerland 
involved in the network. All of them are 
agents in the network. 
2. Environment 
Data Data is the single records provided in the 
blockchain from different organizations.  
Data records are provided on car events 
such as car registration, insurance 
contract, services, repair works, and 
collection of driving behavior data. 
Dossier Each dossier is a digital representation of a 
physical entity in the system. A dossier 
incorporates data from the blockchain, 
provided in different time periods from 
different organizations. 
The dossier holds data related to the 
specific car throughout its lifecycle. 
3. Interactions 
Organization’s 
activities 
Organizations in the network perform the 
following activities:  
- join/leave the network 
- provide data 
- purchase data (associated with money 
flow) 
- govern the network (report for correction) 
An insurance company may enter the 
network or leave it due to several 
reasons. It may provide data on 
insurance policies and accident reports. 
It may purchase usage data to make 
more individualized offerings for its 
clients. It may report incorrectness of 
purchased information. 
Correction 
mechanism 
Once an organization reports a data record in 
a dossier, a committee votes on whether the 
issue is to be corrected or not. Depending on 
the origin of the information, the committee 
may include external party, regulator, and be 
built up of one or more organizations. 
There might also be additional regular checks 
of an amount of stored the data (depending on 
its type, amount, origin, or time spent in the 
system). 
1. Reported issues are checked by:  
- the Road Traffic Agency in case of 
security-related data 
- an independent committee in case of 
non-security-related data 
 
2. Regular checks may be performed by 
The Road Traffic Agency, e.g., for 1% of 
all security-relevant data. 
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The dossier rating for each organization reflects the correctness of the data supply from this organization 
to the given dossier. The dossier rating is calculated per dossier. The dossier rating is determined as follows: 𝑑𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 789:89;< × 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ?−𝜆 7BCBDEFG89H <I, 
where 𝜆 is the decay factor of the dossier rating (the higher it is, the more data the role needs to supply); 𝑞	is the actual number of static6 data units, which the agent provides; 	𝑄	is the maximum number of static 
data units, which the role should provide; 𝑡 is the current time; 𝑡$#)B  is the timestamp of the last data unit 
added; and 𝑁 is the total number of dynamic data units, which the agent provides.  
The system rating for each organization reflects their activities in the correction mechanism depending on 
whether or not they report incorrect data to be corrected. This rating increases if the reported data was 
corrected (meaning that it was reported correctly). This is a part of the correction mechanism that helps to 
maintain a better quality of data in dossiers. The system rating is determined as follows: 𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = PQR	(TU9TVWV9TXWX)89PQR	(TU9TVWV9TXWX), 
where 𝑥8 is the number of reported errors, 𝑥Z is the number of confirmed misconducts, 𝛽\ is the intercept 
parameter which defines the initial value of the system rating,	𝛽8, 𝛽Z  are consequently the reward and 
punishment intensity of the correction mechanism.  
Consequently, the global rating is determined as follows: 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 = 0.5	𝑥	𝑠𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔	 + 	0.5	𝑥	𝑎𝑣𝑔. 𝑑𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 
Depending on its dossier rating, an organization is rewarded for the provided data. Thus an organization i 
gets a dossier revenue: 𝑑𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 = 𝑝) × 𝑃	 ×	 efg∑eg , 
where 𝑝) is the sale probability, 𝑃 is the price of the dossier, and 𝑅j is the dossier rating. The total revenue 
of an organization is thus a sum of all dossier revenues for which the organization has contributed. 
Environment 
Following the definition of environment (an environment is a “medium for agents to operate on and interact 
with” (Nan 2011)), we consider data and the dossiers, incorporating this data, to be the environment of our 
system. Data units single records in a car’s history (events such as car registration or a car accident) 
provided by organizations inside the system. These data records are then grouped into dossiers. Each 
dossier is created per car and includes all records for the specific car. We differentiate between correct data, 
incorrect data (provided with or without bad intention), and missing data (which could have been provided, 
but was not). Data may be missing for two reasons: the agents participate in the car dossier system but do 
not add data to it (for any reason), or the agents do not participate in the car dossier system. Data can be 
categorized into two types. The first type of data is static data that is only added to a dossier once (e.g., the 
technical characteristics of a car). It is assumed that the role-specific static data for a dossier is known per 
role. Each role has a fixed amount of static data which they should provide once they add a car (in their 
role) to the blockchain. The second type of data is dynamic data. The distinguishing feature of dynamic 
data is that it is changing data that should be provided constantly (e.g., change of mileage). 
The average quality of a dossier may be computed, depending on the amount of incorrect data within it. We 
consider a dossier to be correct when all data in it is correct or has been corrected (even if there is data 
missing). We consider a dossier to be complete when no data is missing (all involved agents have added 
data to the blockchain), even though some of the data might be incorrect. In our simulation, we measure 
for the fraction of correct and complete dossiers in the system. 
Interactions 
Organizations within the system interact with one another and with the system itself. They may join or leave 
the network. For example, in the car dossier, new organizations may enter into the network to benefit from 
                                                             
6 Static and dynamic data is described next under Environment. 
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it, as well as leave it if they do not get expected value or it does not correspond to their business strategy. 
Organizations provide or purchase data. These two interactions are crucial as the value that provided data 
contributes, combined with monetary reward, creates an incentive for organizations to participate in the 
network. The interactions are included in the proposed correction mechanism. Once an incorrect record is 
noticed, it may be reported in order to be checked and corrected if needed (as explained below in the 
scenario for correction of wrong data). The proposed model covers two scenarios: data provision and 
consumption, and correction of wrong data. Figure 1 gives a visual representation of the proposed model. 
Interactions are numbered to give a better overview of the actual sequence of actions for both scenarios. We 
show in these two scenarios how the model works to ensure a higher quality of data inside the system. 
 
Figure 1. Overview of the Incentive Model 
Scenario: “Data Provision and Consumption” 
(1) An organization (e.g., a repair shop) makes a record of an event in the car’s lifecycle (e.g., repair work) 
which is stored in the blockchain. (2) The record from the blockchain is available in the Car Dossier (on an 
application level) for the specific car to be accessed by other participants for a fee. (3) The record is 
purchased and received by another organization (e.g., an insurance company, an individual or even an 
external party). (4a) The payment (from an insurance company in this specific record) is secured in the 
blockchain. (5a) The rating of the repair shop in the system is updated. (6a) Upon a successful purchase, 
the repair shop receives a monetary reward.  
Scenario: “Correction of Wrong Data” 
Here we describe how the incentive mechanism works to keep the quality of provided data high. For this 
we introduce a simple correction mechanism. Important to note: any correction involves adding a new 
record and making the old record invalid, maintaining the transparency of all changes in the blockchain. 
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Steps 1 to 3 remain the same, as described in the data provision and consumption model above. (4b) If the 
insurance company (following the scenario above) notices that a record is incorrect, it reports the record 
for an additional check. This report is stored in the blockchain. (5b) The record is then sent to the 
Committee Check. Assuming the reported issue is relevant for the car’s security, the Road Traffic Agency 
verifies the record. (6b) The agency makes a decision regarding whether the data needs to be corrected or 
not. (7) If the data needs to be corrected, it is corrected in the blockchain. (8) Depending on the decision, 
the rating of both the repair shop and the insurance company is updated. 
Simulation results 
To show the effects of the proposed incentive system, we conduct three numerical experiments. We 
determine the correctness, completeness of dossiers in the system, and the revenues of the agents (behaving 
lawfully or maliciously while incorporating the data). All parameter details are described in Table 3. 
Each simulation is run of T=300 timesteps where the first 100 serve as a stabilization period for the system. 
For each parameter set, the simulations are repeated 100 times. The parameter setting is done for agents 
(including rating and revenues), dossiers, data in the system, and the correction mechanism. The parameter 
combinations used are summarized in Table 4. In the first experiment, we run the simulation to show the 
effect of the correction mechanism. Thus we compare two states of the system – with it and without it. The 
latter two experiments are done with correction to show the influence it has on measurements in the system. 
The parameters we vary in the experiments are different, so the experiments analyze different aspects of 
the response of the system to changing conditions. To be precise, we: 
Experiment 1: we vary the share of malicious agents with full participation fixed, ceteris paribus. 
Experiment 2: we vary the fraction of agents writing to the blockchain (in other words, participation 
rate) with the ∆"#$%&%'()= 0.2 proportion of malicious agents fixed, ceteris paribus. 
Experiment 3: we run the simulation for one particular parameter combination of the above variations 
(full participation, ∆"#$%&%'()= 0.2 proportion of malicious agents). 
 
 
Table 3. Parameter Setting 
Agents • There are 𝑛 = 100 agents with sizes ~𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑜	(2, 1) 
• The agents are split up in 𝑟 = 10 roles (every role is taken by at least one agent) 
• 𝑝" = 0.5 
• Rating:  o 𝛽\ = 	3 
o −10𝛽8 = 	𝛽Z 
o 𝜆 = 0.25, 	𝛽8 = 0.1 
• Revenue: 	 o 𝑝) = 0.1	o 𝑃 = 10	currency	units	
Dossiers • There are с = 3000 dossiers (cars) that enter the system in regular batches (10 dossiers 
per timestep) 
• The dossier’s (equal to vehicle’s) life-span ~	𝑒𝑥𝑝(1/32)	à expected life = 32 timesteps. 
Data • If a new dossier enters the system, one agent from each role is selected with a probability 
of 𝑝% = )f∑z{ (proportional to agent’s relative size within the role). Non-malicious agents 
add 𝑄 = 4 static data units to the car, whereas the malicious agents only add with a 
probability of (1 − 𝑝")  the correct amount of 𝑄  data units to the car; and with a 
probability 𝑝" they add less than 𝑄 data units to the car. 
• In each timestep, each agent receives new data (dynamic data) to add to the blockchain. 
This happens with a probability of 𝑝j = 0.2 for each dossier the agent is involved in. 
Correction 
mechanism 
• In each round, each agent checks a maximum number of dossiers and reports an error 
if they find one. The maximum number is set to 𝐷"#W =40. The expected number of 
dossiers checked per timestep depends on the size of the agent and can be calculated as 
follows: )fCQ_Q(z)CQ_ × 𝐷"#W	, where x_min is the minimum value of the size distribution. 
Experiment 1 – Correctness of dossiers. In the first experiment, Correctness of Dossiers, we run simulations 
to show if an introduced correction mechanism helps to increase the quality of dossiers in terms of their 
correctness (fulfilling the first requirement for correctness). Within this experiment we show to what extent 
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the correction mechanism can increase the correctness of dossiers in the system. We vary the proportion of 
malicious agents in the system. For this, we measure the fraction of correct dossiers (meaning there is no 
incorrect data in a dossier) before and after application of the correction mechanism. We also look at the 
average fraction of correct data (again, as opposed to incorrect data) per dossier. 
The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 2. The system without correction can provide a relatively 
high quality of dossiers (above 70%) only when the proportion of malicious data is very low (under 0.05). 
The most important result from this experiment is the calculation of the fraction of correct dossiers, with 
and without the correction mechanisms. Strikingly, with this parameter set, the fraction of correct dossiers 
without correction in place drops to zero when the number of malicious agents is larger than 0.5 - in what 
is a tipping point. With the correction mechanism in place, however, for the tipping point the rate of correct 
dossier reaches 0.5. Even when the proportion of malicious agents is 1, 20% of the dossiers are correct. We 
conclude that the correction mechanism proposed is very effective for the task proposed.  
Experiment 2 – Completeness of Dossiers. In the second experiment, Completeness of Dossiers, we look 
how many market players of different sizes should participate in the system to ensure completeness of 
dossiers (fulfilling the first requirement for completeness). Here, we calculate average completeness of data 
per dossier for varying participation of organizations. Organizations are selected following three different 
procedures: either the largest, the smallest or randomly selected organizations participate in the data 
provision for the blockchain. This reflects three market scenarios in which the Car Dossier consortium 
attracts, respectively, the largest, smallest or random players to take part of the system. We fix the ∆"#$%&%'()=0.2 proportion of malicious agents (which we arbitrarily assume to be a realistic scenario). It is important 
to note that 1 means the whole coverage of the network, while 0.1 represents the largest 10% of companies 
(sorted in descending size order) for the blue line, and the smallest 10% (sorted in ascending size order) for 
the red line. 
The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 3. In order to achieve 80% completeness of the dossiers, 
the system should include at least half of the largest organizations; in order to achieve a similar result 
attracting the smallest organizations, 95% of the smallest firms should be included. Having only 50% of the 
small organizations results in under 20% completeness of dossiers. The graph also shows that with higher 
fractions of organizations, having large organizations quickly results in a high completeness of dossiers 
(above 90% when including more than 65% of agents), and having small organizations high completeness 
(above 80%) with fractions above 0.95. 
Experiment 3 – Revenues of agents. In the third experiment, Revenues of Agents, we investigate how the 
revenues of agents, orchestrated by the rating mechanism, keep incentives to behave well in the system 
higher (by being better rewarded) than to behave maliciously or not to participate at all (by not being able 
to profit). This experiment shows if we could achieve our ultimate goal in creating a consistent and self-
sustaining system by demonstrating how the proposed incentive system influences the revenues 
organizations get for data provision. Here, we fix the ∆"#$%&%'()= 0.2 proportion of malicious agents (as in the 
previous experiment) and assume full participation. The Y-axis shows currency units. 
The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 4. The revenue each agent receives from the sale of 
accesses to the dossier depends on the dossier rating. The results show that malicious agents have lower 
revenues than good agents (892 and 1964 currency units respectively). Good agents generate significantly 
higher total revenues than malicious agents (on average, almost double for the parameters selected).  
Discussion 
Blockchain technology is on in the rise. In the last few years, IS researchers started to approach such topics 
as design, adoption, governance, and use of blockchain systems. This research is intended to develop deeper 
understanding in the emergent field of blockchain governance and, more specifically, in its incentive 
mechanisms. We investigate incentivization problems related to data provision in blockchain systems for 
inter-organizational relationships and propose an incentive system that helps to resolve it. The design of 
incentive mechanisms for blockchain systems is not a trivial task; it highly depends on design properties 
(such as if it is public or private, permissioned or permissionless (Okada et al. 2017)), the purposes of 
participants in the network, their activity and behavior, business context, and exogenous factors such as 
regulation. We see that there is an existing problem related to data provision and data quality in the context 
of inter-organizational data exchange and storage: how we get data inside the network, and, once there, 
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Figure 2. Correctness of dossiers 
 
Figure 3. Completeness of Dossiers 
 
Figure 4. Revenues of agents 
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we ensure the quality of this data. So far, literature suggests that Internet-Of-Things solutions (sensors for 
tracking physical measurements) combined with oracles (a third-party services to verify data) may be a 
feasible solution (Notheisen et al. 2017); however, to our best knowledge, none of the existing studies have 
shown how and to what extent they are useful. We look in more detail at how such a quality-enhancing 
mechanism may function and how effective it is.  
Referring back to the Sub-RQ (How can an incentive mechanism make a blockchain-based inter-
organizational network consistent and self-sustaining?), we suggest that a purely price-based incentive 
system (an organization gains revenue for the amount of data it contributes to the system) is neither 
adequate nor sufficient to solve the identified problems. Therefore, another approach is necessary. For this, 
we introduced a rating mechanism (Okada et al. 2017), influenced by measures for data correction 
(correction mechanism). Therewith, the incentive model does not merely focus on the data providing 
process but rather on the well-being of the whole system. The rating mechanism either gives malicious 
agents no incentive to participate in the system (as they cannot profit from it) or encourages them to behave 
well (providing correct and complete data). The incentive model values the contributions of each participant 
(role-dependent) with a feature to control data quality. This ensures high-quality dossiers and supports 
consistency of the system overall. The incentive model acts as a strong immune system for the blockchain 
system as it punishes bad behavior and encourages the correction of errors. It thereby actively fosters the 
well-being of the system. As a consequence, the incentive system can be called self-sustaining since it 
promotes the longevity of the blockchain network. However, we are assured that exploration of the rating 
function (for both dossier and system ratings) should be continued in future to find an optimal solution.  
With our model, we show that in the absence of the correction mechanism, the quality of the dossiers 
produced in such a system deteriorates in the presence of malicious agents up to a point where a limited 
number of malicious agents is enough for the system to produce dossiers that contain at least some wrong 
information. Our correction mechanism is enough to allow the system to produce a sizeable proportion of 
dossiers with correct information, even in a case where only malicious agents take part of the system. 
Furthermore, market penetration should be considered in blockchains, where completeness of history data 
is crucial. In the example of Car Dossiers, the blockchain brings value only when there are no gaps in the 
provided data. At the same time, if the data is complete, it brings high benefits to each of the organizations 
in the network. Thus onboarding measures should be pushed forward. Our results show that though 
coverage of the whole market is necessary, in order to increase completeness of dossiers in the system, the 
focus should be first put on onboarding the largest players. This will increase completeness of dossiers in 
the system considerably in comparison to having the smallest players alone. To achieve full coverage of the 
market (having all necessary players), there should be additional, exogenous measures. First, one of 
possible measures would be creating a standard to be used in a country or on the market, which might be 
effort-consuming and also take considerable time to establish. Furthermore, possible benefits for market 
players (e.g., efficiency gains, possibilities for new business models) should be demonstrated. For this, it is 
important to address the key players of the industry first. They not only bring volume to the system but also 
have far-reaching connections within the industry. This also includes players that do not act as partners but 
rather have a supportive role (e.g., governmental agencies or software firms). Interestingly, blockchain may 
also change the way organizations cooperate within inter-organizational networks (Popp et al. 2013; Provan 
et al. 2007), bringing competitors together and allowing them to benefit from mutually created good. 
However, to ensure the full participation of the market (including smaller organizations), technical hurdles 
(e.g., integration of existing systems in blockchain infrastructure) should be minimized. 
Going beyond the blockchain hype, together with several organizations and a state institution on board, we 
have shown how an incentive system (as an important part of blockchain governance) can be designed for 
a real case. It is important to highlight that an incentive system is much more powerful if incorporated in 
the existing reality with existing governance mechanisms. In our incentive system, we do not reinvent 
institutions or governments. We rather let them do their daily activities (like security checks for the Road 
Traffic Agency), benefitting from efficiency gains, trust, and information quality a blockchain network is 
able to provide. We believe that this realistic approach strengthens our model, and it also calls for hybrid 
forms of governance. Such hybrid governance should incorporate existing governance mechanisms (e.g., 
those set by the government) in combination with blockchain-related incentives (e.g., to operate the 
network), as Beck et al. (Beck et al. 2018) suggest. These mechanisms can be incorporated into the design 
of a blockchain system in the form of the proposed correction mechanism. The simulation demonstrated 
that such a mechanism keeps data quality high and makes the system resistant to malicious behavior. 
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Furthermore, in the case of the Car Dossier, checks of data records in general (but especially by a state 
authority) may enhance trust in the quality of data. Finally, the existence of such a correction mechanism 
itself makes organizations behave with integrity under the threat of a possible penalty (like a decrease of 
rating and therewith revenues, and also legal measures that may be introduced in the system). Thus we 
conclude that a hybrid governance will help to enhance trust between participants in an inter-organizational 
network (Provan et al. 2007): first, due to incremental blockchain characteristics which offer immutability 
and transparency of transactions (Seebacher and Schüritz 2017); second, due to existing trust-enhancing 
mechanisms, as verification of data by known competent established institutions incorporated in a trust-
free blockchain system (Beck et al. 2016).  
Conclusion 
In this study, we report on an ADR project conducted in collaboration with a blockchain consortium that 
builds up a blockchain-mediated inter-organizational network. This paper addresses the need for a 
consistent and self-sustaining incentive system which should be built on top of the existing technological 
layer. Therewith, we answer the call for more extensive research on incentive systems in blockchain 
economy (Beck et al. 2018) by outlining a specific incentivization problem, on the basis of a real-world case, 
and proposing an incentive model to address it. The contributions of this study are two-fold. First, we 
provide knowledge regarding how an incentive system may be constructed in a blockchain-based inter-
organizational network to resolve problems of insufficient data quality. With this, we complement growing 
literature on blockchain technology (with specific focus on incentive systems for inter-organizational 
networks). Second, we contribute to the practice, showing how such a model can be applied in a real case 
application. This knowledge is valuable for blockchain practitioners in early and mature phases of design 
and development: from the initial idea of building up such a network to actual use and operations. 
This study has several limitations which also offer directions for future research. First, dynamic change of 
the network: we did not consider that agents (organizations) may enter and leave the network dynamically. 
This leads to additional data gaps due to missing partners and variable rates of information in the 
blockchain. Thus, future studies should consider the adaptive behavior of agents. Second, though 
mathematical modelling and simulations are an effective means of studying complex problems, it is still 
necessary to observe such systems operating in real-world situations. We assumed that agents act rationally 
and there are no external factors influencing the system. However, real-world situations could bring both 
additional requirements for organizations to act, and also additional requirements for the system to 
function. For example, further study of the payments, provided as one of the incentives, and their influence 
on the behaviors and trustworthiness of actors (e.g., a mechanic checking the technical qualities of a car). 
Further observation is needed to give more practical insights on operation of such a platform. Third, we did 
not simulate the complexity of market-based pricing for data in dossiers. This calls for extension of the 
model in terms of data supply and demand (to incentivize agents to provide the most demanded data). 
Furthermore, the correctness of the data in the system is highly dependent on the number of malicious 
agents. The next steps would be to check multiple incentive mechanisms and find the optimal one, either 
by providing formal proof, or by searching existing incentives schemes. In addition, a comparison of the 
proposed system with the status quo, or with a system controlled centrally, both in terms of costs of 
operation and in terms of percentage of correct information, could be insightful. We hope that this study 
sheds some light on the design of incentives for blockchain-based inter-organizational networks and 
inspires follow-up studies in the growing research field on blockchain technology. 
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